Research Highlights
I proposed a novel coordination mechanism in the form of a forward auction to allocate the dynamic distribution network accesses to DERAs. The proposed allocation mechanism decouples DSO-DERA-ISO real-time operations and achieves the simplest coordination with minimal deviation from the standard operating procedures. I established theoretical results about individual rationality, revenue adequacy, and price monotonicity for the proposed mechanism in both robust and risk (CVaR) based allocations. [link]
I proposed the first profit-maximizing competitive DER aggregation solution for a DERA to participate in the wholesale electricity market as a virtual storage participant. The proposed aggregation solution ensures that customers of the DERA receive surplus competitive with than under the utility's retail rate. And the social surplus achieved the same level as if individual customers directly participate in the wholesale market with its DERs. [link]
Wholesale market operators are considering allowing merchant storage participants to submit state-of-charge (SoC) dependent bids to capture more accurately the operation and opportunity costs of storage. However, SoC-dependent bid results in an intractable market-clearing model. I proposed a sufficient condition over the SoC-dependent bid to remove the non-convexity and made the multi-interval dispatch with SoC-dependent bids a standard convex piece-wise linear program. Such a convex market clearing for SoC-dependent bid increased storage profits and decreased system cost, compared to SoC-independent bid. [link]